斯蒂格勒的最后一课
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斯老师去世第二天,我即决定译出这部分,当作他对我们的最后一课。2018年冬,英译者Daniel Ross和我读到这部分时就大惊,觉得这是他在交待后事了。这个文本本来是他修订《技术与时间》三卷的后记,后来越写越长,被Ross译出的这部分有130页,放在2018年出版的《逆人类熵纪》的结尾。之后,其中的很多主题又被打散用到了斯老师最后的那一本书《来自气候女候的教训》之中(所以,这文本没有正式的法文稿的,因为斯老师后来将它改掉了)。我这里只是译了、修改了一遍,不准备正式发表,只是帮同志们认真、当真地读一次斯老师的巅峰时期的思想,译文不通的地方请大家立刻滑到英文那里就可以,请不要纠缠在译文里面。

要懂一个人的死,得懂他的哲学,反之亦然。要读懂斯老师的哲学文本,的确有点难,是海德格尔和德里达和他的三合金,肯定不会容易。但哲学阅读也是一种欲望的事业,想要溶解这一合金,你得拿出关心之爱。大致来说,哲学阅读都应该这样,必须爱,冲上去,以不可想象的速度拿下,连自己回头看都不敢相信怎么就给冲过去了。

我自己称这一经历为写读的军事性。写和读是同体的,读是在冲向对世界的“写”的态度,这就是所谓军事性,而一般人都陷在写读的“外交性”之中:想应付,看看周围,能绕则绕,永远推延,甚至想交换和替代。这是非-哲学式态度,也无可厚非。但是,正如下文斯老师将要讲,我们必须关怀式、包扎式地去思考,而且,的确,读写得好,哲学和思想本身的技术完美,也并不是我们的目标。但是,今天,我们陷入一种与人类世、全球变暖下的云计算式数码利维坦包围下的我们的每一个行动的军事性之中了。

这时,写读的军事性在我看来就是:不“写”得清晰和严格,也就无法去作出自己的本体(论)差异,延异或分枝,就无法用写来认识、体验这个世界之重、之轻。读到能以欲望的速度来“写”,才能体认我们今天的这个人类世、全球变暖下的全球总体战争中的情势,测出这个苦难世界的尺度(在今天此刻的那一the sense of this world)。可是,有多少大学毕业生的“写”,是都反而从他们的高考作文那里退化了;大学在堵塞他们的写。

德勒兹在《电影I/II》中的最重要思想也就是观众的走向自己的“时间图像”,说的就是这个本体(论)差异或延异,就是这个写使我们走向自己的时间、自己的真理:“写”得不比云计算平台运算速度快,你将永远抹不开自己头顶上的那片天空的。这就是我说的写读的军事性之首要性。阅读斯老师的技术哲学,就须带上这种军事性。

下面选译的第26、27、28节中,斯老师实际上是在了断他与海德格尔、德里达和二十世纪的很多思想的关系,尤其在技术、知识这两个方面大大地将海德格尔和德里达甩在了后面。他说,技术是人从现有地盘向外探头去“看”时的知(识)。他和海德格尔的学生Boehm认为,海德格尔的《形》和“时间与存在”那两个文本里是有这个意思的,但海德格尔也像我们大家那样,只是有时候才清醒的,自己竟没看出、看清这一层。

技术有两面:人用技术对自己用暴力,再用知识(技术)来修复和治疗。所以,技术人既是罪犯,也是病人(海德格尔自己不就是这样的一个人吗?)。所以,斯老师转而强调,今天,我们不再应该像德里达那样强调对知识的权利(如他晚期对于法国中学生对于哲学的权利的强调,斯老师认为那是肤浅的),而应强调对知识的责任。

对知识的责任这一点贯穿斯老师后期的社会项目。具体说来是这样,比如我自己在大学的课程中也这样尽量实施:知识不是最终目标,而是诱导年青人通过求知而去过上更优美的生活的途径,像一个浮标。如何向一个单身母亲提供一个关于日常生活的app,使她能够在养育子女时,自己也在求知过程中走向更高的跨个人化?一个大学生活,如果找不到自己的严格的读写,他们的心智是会出脓的?我在哲学课中的任务,因此几乎是:让每一个年青人都找到对他们自己的真正挑战性的严格读写,“哲学”只是诱饵。但这做起来又是何其困难。

再比如此时的你的读这个哲学文本这件事:这文本里面并没有解决这个世界的那些问题的最终方案,但它在诱导你在求那种知的过程中去不知不觉过上某种优美的生活,而为了捍卫你想要过的那种优美生活,你就会有话说,有东西要读和写,有事业和项目想要去搞。关怀这个世界,所以说,不仅是因为我们品格高尚,而且还是因为,不去这样关怀,我们自己的生活也是过不好的。而哲学本身就是这样的一种使我们过上优美的生活的途径。如果还在思量为什么这个哲学文本怎么这么难读等等,你就太猥琐了。斯老师的文本常常使人这样,还使很多年青人恼怒。我常说,读斯老师的文本这件事,也是在帮我筛选朋友:一个读斯老师的文本要读得生气的朋友,不读就乱说他的朋友,还可以继续做我的朋友吗?我自己的很多交了半辈子的已入高位的朋友,就都是被我这样断交了,因为,与他们吃饭,要讲到上面这种时,他们已对我构成侮辱。学哲学就是在学交友啊。这也就是斯老师经常与我们讲的朋友间的philia与城邦政治的纠结,的确非常关连我们如何去过一种在我们自己看来是正义的生活这件事的。这事得用哲学来自议。这是哲学的专务。

斯老师在《使生活值得花那份痛苦去过的那一东西》等书中,就在说这个道理。“那一东西”就是知识,这一知识的阴暗面,就是那一tekhnē。

26 The history ofthe future:  technics, ontologicaldifference and knowledge

第26节:关于未来的历史:技术、本体论差异与知识


In What Makes Life Worth Living: OnPharmacology, I recalled that: What is called ‘man’ is apprehended byHeidegger, at the beginning of Being and Time, as Dasein.

在《使生活值得去过的那一东西》一书中,我回顾到:被称作“人”的那一东西,在《存在与时间》开头,被海德格尔称作:此在。

And to this being there[Heidegger] accords [the] privilege […] of posing questions.620

与这一存在者相配合的,是那一提问……的特权。


It is indeedwritten in Being and Time that ‘this being which we ourselves in each case are,and which has in its being and among other things the possibility of posingquestions, will be designated with the name Dasein’.621

的确,《存在与时间》写到:“我们在每种情形下都是、在其存在中和在其它事物之间都含有提问的可能性的这一存在者,我们就以‘此在’这一名字来指认它吧”。


The quotation from On Pharmacology continues:Le**ing Heideggerian thought to one side, I propose that the question of thequestion is that of who, in posing questions, creates long circuits and throughthat adopts that which constantly places into question, namely, thepharmakon.622

从我的《论药学》中的引用可帮我们继续往下说:将海德格尔的思想先撇到一边不说,我想提议,提问的这一问题,是这样的一个人的问题:她在提出这些问题时,就在创造出一些长循环(回路),由此而接纳(认领)了那一不断将我们置入疑问之中的东西,也就是接纳了那一药罐。


The circuit ofadoption always generates a new pharmakon (which could be a neologism or amolecule or an instrument), which in turn always ‘wants’ to be adopted, andwhich itself always launches another putting into question.

接纳之回路总是生产出了新的药罐(它可以是一个新词、一个分子或一件仪器),它转而又总是“想要”被接纳,而它本身总是再一次次地将我们置入疑问之中。

Such is the basisof what Simondon called ‘de-phasing’ [déphasage], shifting phase.623

这正是西蒙东所说的“换档”,移相(位)。

When I was writingOn Pharmacology, I had not yet read Boehm’s ‘Pensée et technique’.

写《论药学》时,我还未读到过海德格尔的学生Rudolf Boehm的“思想与技术”一文。

Reading thisarticle from 1960 brings new elements to the reading of Heidegger, inparticular as concerns the meaning of tekhnē([bat la mesure et la démesure]),– and feeds into my own perspective as arguedvia the question of the doubly epokhal redoubling, which is the system of‘escapement’ (in the horological sense of the word, but also in the sense ofthe forgetting of being) that keeps the measured and excessive beat [bat lamesure et la démesure] of what it is no longer sufficient to call the ‘historyof being’: it is a matter of the history of the future.624

读这一1961年的文章,将一些新的元素带进了我对海德格尔的阅读,尤其是在关于tekhnē的意义这一问题上—助力我原有的阅读角度,也就是双重悬置(时代)再折叠(the doubly epokhal redoubling)那一角度,是那个“逃脱的系统”(从这个字的钟表术的意义上讲,但也是从对存在的遗忘的意义上讲),正是这一逃脱保持了那一被称作“存在的历史”已不够的东西的沉着、过度的节拍:这事关未来的历史了。

Each time thereoccurs – as an echo of a stage of the doubly epokhal redoubling – a challenge,a putting-in-question, what is most difficult and most urgent is to describethis questioning, that is, to discern in what way it is unheard-of andunprecedented, which means, radically improbable because incomparable andtherefore incalculable, and, in this sense, impossible, which makes this todaya today as never before.

每一次有了挑战--作为对于双重悬置再折叠的回应,有了责疑,最重要和最紧要的,是提出这一责疑,也就是问:它是在何种意义上说是从未被听到过的和史无前例的,也就是说,激烈地不可能的;因为不可比较,所以也不可计算,于是在这一意义上说,是不可能的,也正是这一点使今天成为一个从未有过的今天。


To make thisimpossible into a possibility, Möglichkeit, in the sense this is used in‘Letter on Humanism’,625 is what is at stake in Entschlossenheit,626 as well aswith quasi-causality, and it falls within a logic and a history of thatsupplement which is the trace of différance.

要使这一不可能变成可能,Möglichkeit,在这一个字的在《关于人道主义的通信》中的意义上讲的那种意思上理解,是我们这个大决断时代的命门所在,也要依赖于内因,而且也落在延异之踪迹的逻辑和历史之内了。

Such a descriptionis the formulation of the order and disorder of questions engendered by thebeing put in question(s) – a question is never the bearer of just one question– resulting from what Heidegger called ‘setting to work’ (in Werk setzen),which is also to say, putting to work, working, if not machining [usinage].627

这是对由被责疑而引起的提问的有序和失序的程式的描述--一个提问从来不是只承担一个问题,责疑来自海德格尔说的“实施作品(in Werk setzen)”,也可以说,是将作品投入使用,让它起作用,如果不是开动机器(usinage)的话。

The question ofthe order of questions, which forms the foundation of the method that emergesfrom Discourse on Method, is also the issue in what Heidegger calledontological difference.

关于提问的顺序问题,也是(笛卡尔的)《论方法》中出现的方法的基础,同时也是海德格尔说的本体论差异的要点所在。

It is with thisquestion that we must begin, even if it is in an après-coup.

我们正应该从这一提问来开始,哪怕这已是事后再补上。


Such a question oforder cannot remain unaffected by the disorder that, since Clausius,constitutes the direction of the universe in a way that seems to stifle inadvance any horizon of promise, and which is or becomes628 through this factthe first question, and, in a way, the limit between the order and disorder ofthese questions.

这一提问的顺序是不可能不被那一失序所影响的,这一失序自从Clausius以来,构成了这样一个方向,后者从一开始就预先抹煞了许诺的视野,而后者通过这一点是或成了这第一个提问,也在某种程度上是或成了这些提问的有序和失序之间的界限。

We will see,however, that a question of order and disorder629 is present in An Introductionto Metaphysics, and is so as violence, Gewalt. Différance is precisely thisquestion of the deferral and differentiation of disorder by order, and as theviolence of a power.

不过,我们将会看到,关于有序和失序的问题已出现于海德格尔的《形而上学导论》中了,而且是作为暴力(Gewalt)出现的。延异正是这通过秩序来使失序推迟和差异化的问题,是作为权力的暴力到来的。

This différancemust today be understood and made as such: ‘today’, in our time, which is tosay in that moment when disruption gives rise, in what we must understand asthe Entropocene, to a disorder that attempts to impose a new order, but anorder that remains indifférant because it is founded on extremeproletarianization.

这一延异在今天必须被这样理解并被变成这样:“今天”,在我们时代,也就是说,在大扰乱出现之际,在我们必须理解成熵纪的时代,失序也是企图要强加到我们头上的一个秩序,但这一秩序仍只是脱-延异的,因为它基于极度的无产阶级化。

It is thisquestion that we must turn into a problem, as Deleuze says, which means that wemust think care-fully about it by questioning the concept of différance (itsknowledge) and the power of différance on the basis of the economy anddis-economy (the pharmacology) of anthropy and neganthropy: such is the programof a neganthropology.

我们应该将这一提问变成一个问题才对,如德勒兹说,这问题是指:我们必须小心地思考它,通过责疑这一叫做“延异”(及其知识)的概念,和延异的力量,基于人类性的逆人类性的经济和脱-经济(药学):这才应该是逆人类学的纲领。

A question, in thesense of being what constitutes the historial privilege of Dasein (that is, theexosomatic privilege – a privilege that is therefore a problem and not just aquestion), is never ordinary.

一个提问,因为它构成了此在的历史性特权(也就是,体外化特权—这一特权因此也是一个问题,而不只是一个提问),从来都不平常。

It is alwaysextra-ordinary (in Being and Time this is the each-time singular question – inany epoch of the ‘history of being’ – of ontological difference).

它总是不同寻常的(在《存在与时间》中,这被认为是每一次提得都独特的本体论差异的问题—在“存在的历史”的任何时代都这样。(德勒兹的时间图像问题,与本体论差异这个说法接近:提问时,这一图像运动被我看成自己的时间图像和自己的个人时间了)。


And this is whatis said, by antithesis, in the last strophe of the chorus song in Antigone.

而这是在《安提戈涅》的合唱中当作对句唱出来的最后的向左方舞动时的唱词。


What isextra-ordinary is the ‘ontological difference’ that arises out of the ordinary,that is, from what Being and Time calls the ontic.

不同寻常的东西,是从寻常中也就是从《存在与时间》中说明的庸常(the ontic)中兴起的那一“本体论差异”。

But the questionthat falls to us, that falls due for us, and to which Florian bears witness, isnot just an extra-ordinary question, not just ontological in the Heideggeriansense: it is the question of the Ereignis, which in his later writingsHeidegger related to Gestell, as that which puts in question the verypossibility of putting in question, and as the ‘co-propriation’ of the humanand technics-become-Gestell.

但是,落在我们身上的、专为我们而来,和弗洛林(Florian,一个对未来感到彻底绝望的十五岁美国青少年)见证的那一问题,不只是一个非同寻常的问题,并不是海德格尔意义上的本体论问题:它是关于Ereignis(前来彻底改变的大事件)的问题,后者被海德格尔在晚期写作中与Gestell(技术对人类的摆置装置)相搭配,正是它将责疑的可能性本身又加以置疑,最后去“共同-居有”了人类性和成为Gestell的技术。

The questions ofGestell and Bestand appear in 1949, no doubt as the turn par excellence. In1962, Heidegger pronounced his final word on ‘what has been called “Being” upto now’,630 and on that which ‘there is’, on the ‘it gives’ (es gibt).

Gestell和余留(Bestand)的问题出现于1949年,无疑是(海德格尔的)重大转向。在1962年,他对“一直被称作‘存在’的东西”,就那个“给出东西的东西(es gibt)”,发表了最后的意见。

For us, in thetwenty-first century, the ‘task of thinking’ is to undertake a return to thequestion of tekhnē, which in 1960 Boehm showed to be the first, last andconstant issue of thinking throughout Heidegger’s work, where, precisely,knowing is a work, that is, the crafting and fashioning of a difference (withan ‘e’) we must make, which Heidegger called ontological and which with Derridabecame the différance of the trace.

对于身在21世纪的我们,“思想的任务”是努力回转到tekhnē的问题,而Boehm在1960年就向我们展示,这是海德格尔的思想工作中的首要、最终和常在的议题;在这个tekhnē中,知是作,也就是说,是对我们必须作出的那一区分/差异的构筑和打磨,那就是海德格尔说的本体论差异,也就是德里达说的踪迹的延异。

In the order,disorder and chaos of a putting-in-question that clearly upsets everything[nous bouleverse] as never before, the first question that imposes itself uponus as we are gathered here in, behind, before or after what we call philosophy,is not a putting in question of the ‘right to philosophy’.

在显然是史无前例地拉倒了一切的责疑的秩序、失序和大混乱中,强加到我们这些聚集到其之后、之前、亮在或躲在我们所说的哲学之后的我们头上的第一个问题,并不是(如德里达所说)对“对哲学的权利”的责疑。

The first questionthat imposes itself upon us today is the putting in question of the right toknowledge, and, by the same token, not the duty of knowledge but the duty toknowledge: the duty that befalls all of us to guarantee the right and the dutyto access knowledge and to access it ourselves – and thus, the duty to demandto be able to know, organologically, pharmacologically and in the internationthat would thereby be constituted.

强加到今天的我们头上的第一个问题,是对对知识的权利的责疑(我们人人对知识的权利这一点被责疑了),按相同的理路,我们要争取的,不是知识的责任,而是我们对于知识的责任:落在我们身上的责任,是去保证进入知识的权利,和对进入知识、使我们自己进入知识的责任--因而也包括要求能够器官术式地、药术式地、并在由此而被建构的互联国(Internation)基础上去知的责任。

In ‘Pensée ettechnique’, Boehm analyses and compares two texts: on the one hand, ‘On theEssence of Ground’, in which Heidegger establishes that transcendenceconstitutes the horizon of facticity as the ‘being-in’ of Dasein, and, on theother hand, An Introduction to Metaphysics, in which it seems that thistranscendence is fundamentally constituted by the technicity of Dasein.

在“思想和技术”一文中,Boehm分析和比较了海德格尔的两个文本:首先是《论基础(底)的本质》,海德格尔在其中确认,超越(先验)构成了事实性视野,后者是此在的“在其中存在”;另一个文本是《形而上学导论》,在其中,看来,海德格尔认为,这一超越(先验)是由此在的技术性构成的。

Tekhnē, here, is asynonym of knowledge, and so, on this subject, Heidegger modifies hisinterpretation of Plato.

在这一文本里,tekhnē成了知/识的同义词,而且在这一主题上,海德格尔修改了他对柏拉图的解释。

Boehm writes: Ifour claim about the close relationship between the idea of ‘transcendence’ (in‘On the Essence of Ground’) and tekhnē (in the Introduction) is true, then itfollows that one and the same idea is referred, in Heidegger, initially toPlato, whereas, in the later instance, Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy is onthe contrary characterized by the loss of this idea and of the knowledge oforiginary tekhnē.631

Boehm这样写道:

如果我们的关于“超越(先验)”(在“论基础的本质”中)和技术(tekhnē,在《形而上学导论》)之间的紧密关系的声称是对的话,那也就是说,同一个观念我们既指向海德格尔,也一开始就指向柏拉图,而在后一情形中,柏拉图-亚里士多德哲学相反地却失去了这一观念和关于原初技术的知识。

In An Introductionto Metaphysics, this relationship between tekhnē and being – which is then alsocalled dikē, and is so insofar as being is power, Walten – takes the form of aconflict between being and Dasein as a technician who knows only by working, operating,and where tekhnē seemsindeed to constitute a putting-in-question of being by a privileged beingitself put in question, while being reveals itself to be dikē (which, we readin Protagoras, is brought to mortals by Hermes):

在《形而上学导论》中,这一tekhnē和存在之间的关系--那时被海德格尔称为dikē,因为存在是暴力(Walten),所以它是dikē--而这一关系表现为存在与一个只知道劳作、操持的技术人之间的冲突。


在这里,tekhnē似乎的确构成了一个能够责疑自己的优先存在者对于存在的责疑,而存在则自己显现为dikē(我们在《普拉泰戈拉篇》中读到,这一dikē是由爱玛仕神带给人类的):


That the being ofman is tekhnē means that he is violent. That man is violent means that hisbeing is tekhnē. What, then, is the meaning of this word?632

说人的存在是tekhnē,意思就是说,人的存在是凶暴的。说人是凶暴的,也就是说,人的存在是tekhnē。那么,这个字的意思到底是什么?

The violent is theδεινον, that which is dreadful, δεινοτατον.

凶暴是那一δεινον,是那一可怕的东西,δεινοτατον。

Boehm here quotesAn Introduction to Metaphysics on a decisive point: Tekhnē means neither artnor skill, and it means nothing like technology in the modern sense.

Boehn在一个决定性的点上引用了《形而上学导论》:Tekhnē既不指艺术,也不指技能,也与现代意义上的技术一点不相关。

We translatetekhnē as ‘knowing’. But this requires explication. Knowing here does not meanthe result of mere observations about something present at hand that wasformerly unfamiliar.

我们把tekhnē译成“去知道”。但这是需要被澄清的。去知道在这里并不是指对当前在场、而之前不熟悉的东西的观察的结果。

Such items ofinformation are always just accessory, even if they are indispensable toknowing. Knowing, in the genuine sense of tekhnē, means initially andconstantly looking out beyond [Hinaussehen] everything subsistent.

这样的信息拼件总只是辅助性的,哪怕它们对于知道是不可或缺的。知道,在tekhnē的意义上说,最初而且一直是指探出现存的所有东西之外去看(Hinaussehen)。

Thistranscendence…633 And Boehm specifies that ‘instead of Transcendenz, Heideggerhere uses Hinaussein’, in the sense that an object is also called transcendentthat is ‘outside myself’ (Gilbert Kahn translates Hinaussein by‘être-au-dela’).634

这一超越(先验)……。而且Boehm还特别指出,“海德格尔不用Trascendence,而是用了Hinaussehen这个字”,意思是,一个对象如果是“在我之外的”,也就是超越的(先验的)(法译者Gilbert Kahn将它译成了‘être-au-dela’)

This transcendencesets to work in a preliminary way, and in different ways and on different pathsand in different domains, that which alone gives to what subsists its relativelaw, its possible determination and thus its limit.

是这一超越(先验)以初步的方式、以不同的方式、在不同的路径上和在不同的层面上启动了那唯一一个能给予生存者相对的法则、可能的确定,因而也给出其界限的东西。

To know is to knowhow to put being to work in the form of beings.635 In the absence of epoch, asthe fulfilment of nihilism now known as the Anthropocene, and after thisviolence, it seems that this setting to work, as transcendence in the sense ofHinaussein, is the process of exosomatization qua artificial selection bynoetic dreams that ‘realize’ what Heidegger called the ontological difference,but which after Derrida we should call différance.

去知,是去知道如何启动存在,去以存在物的形式存在出来。没有了时代后,在被称作人类世的现在的虚无主义的满格之后,并且在这一暴力之后,似乎,这一启动,Hinaussein这个字的意义上说的超越,是须由心智之梦来作出人工筛选和体外化过程,只有它才能实现海德格尔说的本体论差异了,而后者在德里达之后被我们称作延异了。

This différance,however, must be understood as a question of entropy, and of the deferral thatdifférantiates it and spaces it (a question that Derrida did not take up), andit must be specified as noetic (and preceded by vital différance), and hence asalways engendering pharmaka, which is also to say nightmares: it ‘is’ thatwhich there is qua Gestell.

不过,这一延异却必须被理解为一个熵的问题,一个关于拖延的问题,是那个延异熵的过程,是要间隔它(这一问题德里达没有顾及),而且必须被具体化为一个心智上的问题(后于生命式延异),因而总是引发各种药罐的作用,也就是说总是会引起各

种恶梦的:它“是”作为Gestell(摆布我们的技术装置)已经在那里的东西。

Hence the Greeks calledart and artworks tekhnē in a privileged sense, because art is what mostimmediately brings being – that is, the appearing that stands there in itself –into being (in the work).636

正因此,古希腊人优先地将艺术和艺术作品称作tekhnē,因为,艺术是最直接地将存在--也就是自己站立在自己之中的那东西--带入存在(带入作品)的东西。

Being, here, isdikē: dikē ex-presses being in its conflict with tekhnē, a conflict where,however, being appears via the beings that tekhnē constitutes. This deinon is,according to Heidegger, twofold: the uncanny is, on the one hand, that violence(Gewalttätigkeit) which profoundly characterizes the very existence of thehuman being and which properly speaking constitutes its essence; and, on theother hand, the still more powerful overwhelmingness (das Überwältigende) ofbeing, which, at the same time, provokes and breaks the violent ‘reaction’against it and that is the being of man.637

而另一方面,存在的那一更加强大的不可阻挡性(das Überwältigende)同时也引发和**了那对对它的暴力式的“反应”,而这才是人的存在。这里,存在是dikē:dikē表达出了存在与tekhnē之间的冲突,不过,在这一冲突中,存在是作为由tekhnē所构成的存在物显现的。这一deinon(可怕地强大者,但也是定夺者),根据海德格尔,是两重的:一方面,诡异就是那一暴力性(Gewalttätigkeit),是人的存在本身的深刻特点,实际上也构成人的本质。

The genesis ofbeing and of its difference, so to speak, is this conflict between two powersand two violences.

存在及其差异的生成,也可以说就是两种力量和两种暴力之间的冲突。

In this conflict,being presents itself to the privileged being that is Dasein as dikē: The reignof this super-eminence of being and its disturbing uncanniness is expressed,according to Heidegger, in the Greek word dikē; that in which the violence thatpervades the existence of man consists can be understood by reflecting on theoriginal meaning of the word tekhnē.638

在这一冲突中,存在将自己显现为那一优先的存在,也就是显现为作为dikē的此在:存在的这一压倒一切的统治,及其令人惊惧的诡异,根据海德格尔,是被表达在这个希腊语单词dikē中。弥漫于人的存在、构成人的暴力,是可以被理解为反映在tekhnē这个单词的原初意义中的。

Here, Boehm againquotes Heidegger: Thus, deinon as the overwhelming [that is, the powerful](dikē) and deinon as the violence-doing (tekhnē) confront each other. […]

这里,Boehm再次引用了海德格尔:这样看,由最可怕地强大的东西来主导一切者(deinon),既压倒一切,又施加(暴力),是互施暴力。

Tekhnē breaks outagainst dikē, which, for its part, as fittingness (Fug), has all tekhnē at itsdisposal.639

Tekhnē冲出来对抗dikē,后者则是用了所有可到手的tekhnē来弥补(Fug)。

Hence: It [thisconfrontation] is only insofar as the uncanniest, human being, happens –insofar as humanity essentially unfolds as history.640

因而,正是这一对抗才使最诡秘异者也就是人能够发生,也正因此,人类本质地展现为历史。

What is at stakein this conflict – which Heidegger described as the history of being, and whichwe are calling noetic différance insofar as it is neganthropic within theviolence of that exosomatization by which ‘human being, insofar as it exists’,is dreadful and violent, in the confrontation with all being, and thus withitself – is the doubly epokhal redoubling inasmuch as noesis can reconstitute apeaceful possibility fordikē that can only ever be temporary, and within which conflicts simmer.

这一冲突—这一被海德格尔描述为存在的历史,我们这里称作心智延异的东西,因为它在体外化中是逆熵的,这一“存在的人”的体外化,是可怕和凶暴的,与所有存在者对抗,因此也与它自己对抗--中的最紧要者,就是我说的双重悬置之再折叠,通过后者,心智存在者才能重构一个能达到dikē的和平的可能性,但后者总是暂时,冲突总已蜇伏在那里,等待爆发。

These conflicts,when they generate knowledge, can be both polemic and pacific: this is what theancient Greeks knew as the experience of logos – and it is what we learn fromHeraclitus.641

在(我们)能够生产出知识时,这些冲突是既对抗又和平的:这就是古希腊人所知道的logos的经验,我们是从赫拉克利特那里知道这一点的。




27 Knowledge,capital and the Anthropocene: capital as noetic indifférance and the violenceof power today

第27节:知识、资本和人类世:作为心智脱-延异的资本和今天的权力的暴力

Knowledge (ofbeing) is tekhnē: it is tekhnē that puts us in question – making us journeytowards knowledge, which it, nevertheless, has always already put into questionanew.

(关于人的存在的)知识才是tekhnē:是tekhnē将我们置入疑问,使我们走向知识,但这一知识一定总是又一次重新将我们置入疑问。

For if tekhnē is knowledge, it is also andalways what obliterates knowledge, as well as the right to know, and hence theduty to know.

因为,如果tekhnē是关于人的存在的知识,那它就也、总是使知识过时的东西,也、总是对知识的权利,因而也、总是对知识的责任。

And this is sobecause, as Marx and Engels showed in 1845– 46,642 tekhnē as knowledge is alsothe power to exercise domination through an exteriorization without return,that is, without re-interiorization – and therefore without noetic différance:in a noetic indifférance that is also a fiduciary, that is, calculable, différance,which is called capital.643

而这是因为,正如马克思和恩格斯在1845年-46年所证明,作为知识的tekhnē也是通过无回返的也就是不再重新体内化--因而不带心智延异的体外化--而实行了主导:

如果没有心智延异,那也就是在信用上被托付、也就成了可计算的延异,那就是我们说的资本了。

Such is theparadox of knowledge that remains only exteriorized knowledge, and whichthereby becomes proletarianizable.

这正是知识的悖谬:它总只剩为被外化的知识,因而总是可无产阶级化和非人化、废人化的。

It is Socrates whoin the Phaedrus first investigates this machinic fate of knowledge, and it isin this light that we should reread the Grundrisse.

正是苏格拉底在《斐德罗篇》中第一个来研究知识的机器式命运,我们正应该从这一眼光从出发来读马克思的《大纲》。

Tekhnē is whatopens this question but also what makes it inaccessible and closes it off.

Tekhnē打开了这一问题,但也使这一问题无法被进入,并使之关闭。

And it is in theseterms that Boehm concludes his own analysis: Just as constantly as with thequestion of the meaning of being, Heidegger seems preoccupied by a problemthat, although it shows itself in many different guises, in varying contextsand from changing perspectives, remains fundamentally the same: the problemthat results from a technical condition within which thinking seems inevitablyconstrained whenever it intends to undertake a setting-to-work of its truth.644

正是考虑到这个,Boehm的文章才这样总结了他自己的分析:正如海德格尔持续地关注存在的意义,他似乎也一直关注这样一个问题:这问题以不同的外表、在多变的上下文中和从各种变动的角度来显现,但它根本地一直是同一个问题:思想一旦想要上演它的真理,就不可避免地被局限在其技术条件中。

Truth, alētheia,is set into work [mise en oeuvre], is Werk, that is, work, machining,fabrication .

真理,alētheia,被启动,就成了作品,也就成了工作,机器式运作,和制作(tr**ail, usinage et fabrication)。

In the languageadopted in Automatic Society and Dans la disruption in order to p**e the wayfor the continuation of Technics and Time, this ‘truth’ is that ofexosomatization – which is also to say, what Hegel had already described asexteriorization,645 which constitutes the Wirklichkeit of the phenomenology ofSpirit, and the production of exosomaticorgans as it is described by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology.

用为了续写《技术与时间》而铺路的我的《自动社会》和《处于冲扰之中》两书中所采用的语言来说,这一“真理”是体外化的真理;黑格尔也已将这过程描述为外化,后者构成了精神的现象学的现实性(实在,Wirklichkeit),以及对体外化器官的生产,马克思和恩格斯曾在《德意志意识形态》中论及了后者。

Exosomatization istekhnē inasmuch as through it being is given only while withdrawing – aspharmakon.

体外化就是tekhnē,因为存在只有通过它,才被--当作药罐--给出,在回退的同时。


Indeed, any tekhnēor technics to which thinking must nevertheless appeal in order to evoke themeaning of being seems that it must inevitably provoke a conflict between thisoriginal meaning of being and, precisely, the attempt to think it.

的确,思想为了唤起存在的意义而必须求助的tekhnē或技术,必然会不可避免地激起这一存在的原初意义与我们想要思考它这一点之间的冲突。

Does being itself,therefore, originarily refuse the evocation of its meaning?646

因而,难道存在本身原初就拒绝我们去唤起它(存在)的意义?

It is on the basisof such questions that we should read Identity and Difference,647 ‘The Turn’648and ‘Time and Being’.649

我们应当基于这些问题去读海德格尔的《同一和差异》、《转向》和《时间与存在》。

Failing which, theprovocation (das Herausfordern) that is Gestell remains incomprehensible, andfalls into the disastrous interpretation of Heidegger by the French littleHeideggerians.

不这样去读,对人的存在之境之外的东西的探头张望(das Herausfordern),也就是Gestell(用技术装置来摆布人自己),就都将是不可理解的,就会落进法国的那些眯眯小的海德格尔主义者的对海德格尔的解释之中。

Or would thetechnical provocation of being itself, according to the very meaning of being,be both the only mode possible and the only authentic mode of such anevocation, and in such a way that thinking would succeed in bursting apart themeaning of being by the very fact of the failure of its work?650

或者说,对于存在的技术式激发,据存在的意义本身,难道既是唯一可能的模态,也是这样的激发的唯一本真的模态,以至于说,思想只有通过其作品(所寻的真理)的失败,才能掰开存在的意义?

To burst apart[éclater] the meaning of being, to make it fail, therefore, would or could be‘the only authentic mode of […] an evocation’ of being!

掰开(éclater)存在的意义来看,并使这一看失败,因而才可以是和可能是存在的“召唤存在的…唯一的本真模态”!

For once, we areindeed entitled to use an exclamation mark – here, as never before, on thisregister that gives so much to think about care-fully [donner à panser].

就这一次,我们的确有权用一次感叹号了--这里,从未有过的,在这一给出这么多让我们小心地包扎着思考的语境,这一点的确值得我们惊呼一次。

The failure is thedefault, that is, hubris, and inasmuch as it is necessary, even though italways re-commits [refait] the default, and does so as violence, Gewalt, whichis also authority, that is, power.651

这一失败,是错失,也就是,过度,考虑到那是必要的,尽管总是一再重犯这种错失,而且还带来暴力,Gewalt,后者也是权威,也就是权力。

It is this failurethat becomes power precisely as that which is necessary, that is, what theGreeks called anankē, necessity as well as fate, Geschick.

正是这一失败成了权力,那种必要的权力,那就是古希腊人所称的anankē,是像命运那样地必要的,是海德格尔说的Geschick。


And this is whatdikē means – which calls for aidōs, but about the latter Heidegger has here notone word to say.

而这正是dikē的意思--它召唤aidōs,羞耻,但就此,后期海德格尔竟只字未提。

But if this is so,should philosophy then forget being and simply concentrate its efforts onreaching the greatest perfection of its technique?

如果情形果真如此,难道哲学就应当遗忘存在,而专注于努力达到(哲学本身的)技术的最完美程度?

Or, finally, wouldthere still remain a possibility for thinking to discard its links to atechnical condition?652

抑或,思想仍有可能抛弃其与某种技术条件的关联?


On this finalquestion Heidegger would stumble until the end.

就这最后一个问题,海德格尔吞吞吐吐到最后也没有个说法。

As for thepossibility that philosophy might ‘simply concentrate its efforts on

reaching thegreatest perfection of its technique’, this is the disastrous point to which weh**e arrived precisely in and since the denial and the dis**owal of thetechnicity of panser.

至于哲学可以“仅仅努力去达到其(哲学)技术的最完美状态”这一可能性,到今天已是灾难性的,我们今天的掩耳盗铃和对包扎式思想的技术性推诿,恰恰已到了何其严重的地步。


Philosophy doesnot refer, here, only to what we call ‘philosophy’: it refers to the knowledgeemerging from the history of being in totality, that is, in the first place,mathematics and physics, and then to everything that emerges in the twentieth centuryas cybernetics, which, in this sense, is also a kind of philosophy.

哲学并不只指称我们所说的“哲学”:它还指称从总体的存在的历史中涌现的知识,也就是说,哲学首先是指数学和物理学,然后还指称所有从二十世纪中冒出来的那些知识,比如控制论,它就是上面说的这种意义上的一种哲学。

We know that, forHeidegger, Wiener, along with Heisenberg, was a subject of his attention.

我们知道,对于海德格尔,与维纳还有海森堡一样,控制论曾是他关注的主题。

But what Heideggerpays no attention to is that which constitutes – for care-ful thinking aboutthe there (Da) within which hubris exercises the power and violence of dikē,which is not simply law (nomos) – a crucial new element, namely, negentropiclocality, brought to light by Schrödinger in 1943.

海德格尔忽略的这个,恰恰构成了--为了关怀/包扎式地思考此在中的此(这/Da),过度恰恰是在其中施行dikē权力和暴力的,dikē不只是法(nomos)--一个关键的新元素,也就是逆熵本地性,那是由薛定谔在1943年向我们揭示的。

To pay attentionto this there that opens up a world ‘poor in world’, and to pay attention tothe conditions for enriching this impoverished world that is also the violentpossibility of a destruction of these worlds – such is our task, beyondSchrödinger as beyond Heidegger and Derrida, and this requires care-fulthinking about exosomatization.

关注这个“此/这(Da)”,就打开了一个“贫于世界”(海德格尔说人有世界,动物少世界,岩石就更少(贫))的世界,并且为了丰富这个贫的世界(那也构成毁灭那些世界的暴力条件),而去关注那些限制条件,这就是我们的任务,这要求我们走到薛定谔这外,也走到海德格尔和德里达之外,而这要求我们对体外化作关怀式/包扎式思考。

The ‘greatestperfection’ of technics is what is attained here [là] where Gestell is imposedas ‘the Being of what is today all over the earth’, as Heidegger wrote at thebeginning of ‘Time and Being’.653

技术的“最完美程度”是在“此(Da)”中被达到的,Gestell被当作“存在于今天的地球上的所有地方的东西的存在”强加到了我们头上,正如海德格尔在“时间与存在”一文中所写。

And it is Gestellthat thereby establishes ‘the relation of man to what has been called “Being”up to now’.654

而正是Gestell因而建立了“人与至今一直被称作‘存在’之间的关系”。

These are thequestions that open up with the conclusion of Rudolf Boehm’s article.

这就是Rudolf Boehm那一篇文章在总结部分所打开的那些问题。




28 The uncared-for

那未被关心者

Let us ourselves(reader and author) recapitulate, and let us draw whatever conclusion ispossible at present.

就让我们(读者和作者)再回溯一下上面说过的内容,就让我们来得出在此刻可能的无论什么结论吧。


The duty ofphilosophy in the Anthropocene, where Florian can no longer h**e waking dreams,is to turn to the natural sciences as well as the human and social sciences,and also to the sciences and technologies of the digital, and to break withwhat has formed a disabling limit of ‘deconstruction’, namely: the absence ofany dialogue with science and mathematics.

在十五岁的美国少年Florian发现已不能够做白日梦的人类世中的哲学的责任,是回到自然科学,也回到人文和社会科学,也回到数码的科学和技术中,去打***构”所已形成的致残的界限:也就是,与科学和数学之间的对话的缺无。

We must go beyondthis situation, which was established in the early 1970s.

我们必须走出这一情形之外,这一情形是在1970年代初确立的。

This requires a profound reinterpretation ofdifférance and its traceological supplementarity.

这要求我们对延异及其踪迹(术)增补性作出一种深刻的再解释。

This also meansthat here, philosophy does not come claiming an established right: it proposesa field characterized by a spectrum of obligations that affect all academicclaims within the sphere of rationality – and this obviously amounts to anotherinterpretation of rationality – that is, an interpretation of reason as theorgan and the function capableof dreaming, forming and setting-to-work ‘rational’ motives (that is, motoraffects).

这也意味着,哲学并不是要来这里宣称一种已被确立的权利:它是要来提出一个领域,其中包含一个由诸种义务构成的频谱,这些义务将会影响在理性的领域担任职位的所有学术方向--而这显然等于要对理性作出另外一种解释--也就是,将理性解释为

那种能够做梦、形成和实施“理性的”动机(也就是是,运动感性)的器官和功能。

Here, reason isnot dis-affected calculation, which in the twentyfirst century becomesalgorithmic, but rather a matter of the hermeneutic investment of traces, andof differentiating from the new anti-political economy in and through aneganthropological différance whose operation must effect bifurcations – afterthe default.

这里,理性不是不带情感的计算,但这一计算在二十一世纪却已成了算法性的,而是对踪迹的解释学投资,是在某种逆人类熵式延异中并通过它,来从新的反-政治经济那里分差,这一逆人类熵式延异必须引发分枝—在那一错失之后。

To make (the)différance can only be to articulate the logic of the supplement with thehistory of the supplement – and vice versa, which means, to experience[expérimenter] the logic of the supplement and to make it into an Epimetheanaffair in this sense, which cannot contain itself to logos inasmuch as‘logocentrism’ has always involved a failure to see that language is a case ofexosomatization.

造成(那一)延异只能是:用增补的历史去表达出增补充的逻辑--或倒过来,也就是说,去实验式地经历(expérimenter)增补的逻辑,并使之成为一桩爱毗米修斯式的事务,也就是说,它不能将它自己限在logos里,因为“逻各斯中心主义”总已不能看到:语言也是体外化的一种情形。

To experience the history of the supplementthrough the logic of the supplement and vice versa is to experiment with it byputting it to the test, to undergo the ordeal of the violence of tekhnē inorder to realize the necessary pacification.

通过增补充的逻辑去实验性地经验增补充的历史,或倒过来,是要考验、测试它地经验它,是要主动去经受tekhnē的暴力之折磨,以便达到那一必要的平复。

It is, in otherwords, to uphold the law [faire droit au droit], to face up to our fatum – butwhat fatum? The fatum of generalized degradation of a kind that Lévi-Strausscould never h**e envisaged, thought or cared for, or supported.

换句话说,这是要去支撑那一法(faire droit au droit,为那一法撑腰),直面的我们的fatum--但哪一fatum?列维-斯特劳斯从来不能预想、思想或关心或衬持的那一种普遍的被贬低。

The duty ofphilosophy is to make this différance – which performatively gives itself thelaw through this very fact.

哲学的责任是去作出这一延异—使动地,通过这一点,也给哲学立了法。

It is, in other words, to bring thisperformativity, which so fascinated Derrida,655 to the point of its fullynoetic consideration, so that it can again become suggestive for care-fulthinking of theories of bifurcation.

这换句话说,这是要使心智充分考虑到这一使动性,后者是如此地使德里达着迷,来诱导我们对各种关于分枝的理论作出很关心式的思考。

A performativeutterance constitutes an event occurring within a context and requiring asignature: it is, in this way, a bifurcation – and, precisely, a noeticbifurcation.

使动式表达一个事件,发生于一个上下文之中,要求一个签名:这样的话,它才是一次分枝—也才是心智上的分枝。

Philosophy mustassume this task today, and it can do so only organologically: the conditionsof possibility and impossibility of performance understood in this sense arethose of ‘code’, in Lessig’s sense.

哲学在今天必须承担这一任务,而它只能在器官术上来这么做:如此理解的使动之可能性和不可能性的条件,正是Lessig意义上的“算符”的意思。

This obviouslyraises the question of writing in Derrida’s sense, and of this very strange historyof supplementarity in which code – which Derrida more or less imprudentlyrelated to the ‘genetic program’ (and on this point Atlan had grounds fordisagreement: genetic code as it was thought in the epoch of Of Grammatology istoday no longer conceived as a ‘program’) – has today become a function,serving not reason but, precisely, the understanding, and an automaticunderstanding, which is exactly what Chris Anderson describes, and as theproletarianization of reason itself (but Anderson sees nothing of this).

这显然会引发德里达意义上的写的问题,以及引发这一增补的非常奇怪的历史—德里达或多或少是莽撞地将它与“遗传(基因)程序”关联了起来(在这一点上说,Atlan的异议是有道理的:德里达在《论写术》中思考的遗传代码,在今天不再被看成程序,而是成了函数,它不是为理性服务,而是为理解效劳的,而且是为自动理解服务的,正如Chris Andrson所描述的那样,那是理性的被无产阶级化(但Anderson自己并没有看出这一点)。

But such anautomatic understanding has, through this very fact, lost (its) reason.

但这样一种自动的理解正因此而失去了它的理性。

Theories ofpositive and negative entropy, of dissipative structures, of chaos, order anddisorder,656 but also information theory, cybernetics and their degradedextensions into cognitivism and even their integration by Gilbert Simondon intohis (allagmatic) concept of information, are incapable of being mobilized forwhat we are here calling panser in the Anthropocene – care-ful thinking towardsthe Neganthropocene.

关于积极熵和消极熵、关于耗散结构、关于混沌、秩序和无序的各种理论,还有信息理论、控制论和它们的那些向认知主义的退化的延伸,甚至哪怕是将西蒙东整合到他的关于信息的(相位)概念上,哪怕是动员了所有这些理论,也都不足以成为人类世里的那种包扎式思想--走向逆人类纪的关怀式思想。

All these forms ofthinking, deriving from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, remainfundamentally locked within a failure to consider tekhnē – a neglect throughwhich the indifférance of tekhnē is able to come fully into play, as theunthought and the uncared-for, the impansé.

所有的这些思想形式都从十九和二十世纪派生出来,仍根本地无力思考tekhnē--正是这一忽视和不能才使tekhnē脱-延异、非思、无人关心和无包扎会如此大行其道。

The 2015 and 2016pharmakon.fr seminars and summer academies were devoted to showing thatorganology requires new ways of theorizing entropy and negentropy – as anthropyand neganthropy – where the pharmakon is what always produces both entropy andnegentropy in ways that are not just those of the living.

2015年和2016年pharmakon.fr讨论班和暑期学校是要证明器官术要求一种将熵和逆熵--作为人类熵和逆人类熵--的理论化的新方式;这其中,药罐总是以不只是活物的方式同时生产出了熵和逆熵。

This is whatcybernetics, information theory and cognitivism all ignore, as does Simondon.

这是控制论、信息理论和认知论都忽略的,连西蒙东也忽略了它。

Only on thiscondition will it be possible and fruitful to engage a new critique ofpolitical economy (passing through GeorgescuRoegen), at a moment whenautomation is consigning global capitalism to a structural insolvency that isitself equally global.

在自动化正将全球资本主义拖向一种同样是全球性的结构性破产的时刻,只有基于这一限定,我们才有可能、才能搞定一种新的政治经济学批判(经由Georgescu-Roegen)。

Only amacro-economics founded on a systemic culture of neganthropy could bring abouta new ‘shift’, giving rise to a new epoch of epokhality itself: an epokhē beingwhat as such comes about thanks to a neganthropic bifurcation.

只有一种基于逆人类熵的系统文化的宏观经济学,才能够带来一种新的“转折”了,才能引发一种时代性(悬置性)的新时代:要依赖一种逆熵的分枝,一个新的时代才会到来。

This is the significanceof the questions of Ereignis and Gestell in ‘The End of Philosophy and the Taskof Thinking’657 and ‘Time and Being’.

这正是海德格尔在“哲学的终结和思的任务”和“时间与存在”两篇文章中的关于Ereignis和Gestell的那些问题的重大意义所在。

These lectures were not given until afterBoehm had published ‘Pensée et technique’658 – and they should be read on thebasis of Boehm’s analysis, which breaks with Heideggerian doxa on many planes,including those by which Heidegger himself understood his own work, beinghimself intermittent, that is, falling prey [déchéant], through those backwardssteps [reculs] that are symptoms of his politico-spiritual errancy (thequestion of Geist imposing itself precisely here).659

Contrary to thisdoxa, tekhnē, as Heidegger discusses it in An Introduction to Metaphysics,constitutes a quite singular regime of différance to which even Derridaultimately remained indifférant – indifferent to its as such and to everythingthat in Heidegger stems from it.

与习见认为的相反,如海德格尔在《形而上学导论》中所讨论的这一tekhnē构成了一种很独特的延异的配方,对这个配方,德里达到最后也是莫知莫觉,不知它本身,也压根不知可从海德格尔那里延伸出来的关于这一点的一切。

To thinkcare-fully about this age of différance, which is therefore necessarily also anage of indifférance, is what Florian expects of us, without knowing it,precisely because he cannot know without us, who in turn cannot know without hewho suffers the consequences of this indifférance.

要仔细地、包扎式地思考这一也必然是脱-延异时代的延异时代,是那个已绝望到看不见任何未来的15岁美国少年Florian不经意地期望我们做的事,恰恰因为,如果没有我们,他也不可能知道,而反过来说,没有像他这样的正遭受脱-延异之后果的人,我们也不可能知道。

He does not h**ewithin himself the resources to fight it, because noetic différance cannot beconstituted without transmission, without a heritage, which is always the moreor less dampened violence of a test of strength with and in theintergenerational and the transgenerational.

他在他自己的身上没有用来与之战争的关键资源,因为心智延异如果不通过传输、不继承,是无法构成的,后者总是一种减量的暴力,是拿到代际关系和超代际关系之中来测试我们身上的力量的。

Indifférance isprecisely what short-circuits this test, this combat (polemos), which is thescene spoken of by Heidegger in An Introduction to Metaphysics and interpretedby Boehm, a scene in which the name of necessity is dikē – ‘justice beyondlaw’, as Derrida said.

脱-延异恰恰是会短路这一考验、这一战斗(polemos)的东西,这场景,海德格尔在《形而上学导论》中已说及,已由Boehm阐释出来,在这一场景中,必然性以dikē为名,德里达称它为“法之外的正义”。


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