来源：艺术-小说 文：陆兴华

一、我们的文明的灵活性

贝特森提醒，我们的文明正像一个走钢丝的杂技演员，需要很多余地来平衡自己。它是一个复杂系统，不断打断，总有待修复后达到平衡（homeostasis）。

什么是复杂系统?它必须开放，并容忍我们对其基本硬编程作出缓慢的改变（《走向观念的生态》，499）。它必须复杂到能容忍我们对它的改造。所以，我们不能完全依赖立法，不能完全通过新的宗教仪规，甚至也不能通过社会运动，来改造这个系统或者说环境。贝特森的热烈追随者，著名社会学家卢曼甚至认为，我们也没有别的办法，除了依赖社会系统内的大众媒体为了其广告收入而张罗的节目中进行的那些生态交往，只能耐心等待社会让社会自己知道如何去推动某一个生态议题，然后集体地立正和稍息，然后集体地摆渡到另一个生态议题上。生态问题不是被解决的，而是这样被慢慢地切换，不再成为社会的集体焦虑，被拖延，然后被遗忘的。只有更急迫的生态问题才能替换当前的生态问题。生态问题不是被解决的，而是被替换的。

认为控制论是二十世纪最可靠的科学方法论，贝特森相信它，而不相信人类：他对人类抱一种奇怪的态度：他希望人类不要太聪明，这样就不会用光这个文明的灵活性。最好因为人类不够聪明，而间接限制了人类的贪婪，不会拉满弓，使这个文明倾囊而出，而使它不至于毁灭。我们能希望的，他说，也就只有这么多了。因为，一个“高”文明会用一切可到手的技术用具，去推动和维持其智慧，哪怕用上电脑和其它复杂的通讯手段。拦也拦不住它的。而这只会加快这个文明毁灭的进度（同上，500）。而他认为我们今天就处在这一开向悬崖的列车上了。

贝特森还从生物科学的眼光来考虑这个人类生态僵局。他认为，任何生物系统都由相互连接的变量组成。每一个变量都有上限和下限，有两道容忍的门槛，走出它们之外，生物体就会感到不适、病态和死亡，而呆在里面，只有死得更快。系统也只能先接纳那些被改变的、机会趋紧的变量的容忍界限，才能生存下来。

贝特森就此给出一条衡量人类生态措施的原则：一个措施只有给予这个系统积极的灵活性预留，才是好的（501）。所以说，生态工作者的目标，是要增加生态系统的灵活性，在这方面说，他们是比作为福利工作者的生态斗士们较不专制的，后者总是简单地要去立法管控生态系统。不过，生态工作者仍必须发挥其权威，去保留我们的文明的这一已存在的或将要被创造出来的灵活性。因为，这种社会灵活性，是像石油或钛那样珍贵的资源，必须被恰当地预留，准备用到刀刃上（502）。这是出于战略上的考虑，需有长效的决断，必须不容置疑才行。

这种灵活性对于我们目前的社会分工的专业化而言，就像负熵对于熵那样，会对冲掉一定数量的风险，使系统继续保持复杂。但是，专家们的改造和治理只会增熵，而文明需要的灵活性，只能来自像贝特森这样的能与几种文明对话，以控制论来理解人类在自然生态和精神生态、观念生态中的行动的高人。他在写作中扮演的就是这种从野蛮部落回来的神秘的文明人的角色。康拉德的《黑暗之心》的主人公和《现代启示录》的主人公都没有能够从黑暗深处走回来，而贝特森回来了。他的写作中的表达语气就复杂在这里。

灵活性可被定义为未被征用的变化的潜能。一个电话系统的例子：都拔打时，就容易打爆。好的电话线路系统是大家都不大用，但时时被预留的（502）。这是控制论想要达到的系统的理想目标。可惜，我们的资本主义文明已经成了一个超负荷的系统，是否能够逆转，已不好说了。今天的困境是，我们并不知道我们的文明的这种灵活性的余额了。

对于贝特森而言，新生态将不是我们另外找到的一个新自然，也不是找到了新的生态原则后建立的新文明，而是使原有系统进入这种“还有余地”的状态，不论原有系统有多大问题，都只是建立这种余地的问题。他反对我们对环境问题的直接出手。他认为这种西方人擅长的办法是作死。他在写作中全面否定了西方人的价值观。作为中国道家的十多年的修炼者，他也并不认为道家是出路。

对于贝特森而言，一个健康的系统可比作一个走钢丝的杂技演员。为了不从钢丝上跌下来，他必须能自由地从一个位置移向另一个位置。某些变量，如他的手臂位置和手臂的运动节率，都必须被给予巨大的灵活性。从这个角度看，贝特森认为，法律肯定不是稳定各种变量的最恰当手段。必须依赖我们社会中的教育和个人的性格形成，而在今天，这两者正在我们的社会中受到重大冲击（503）。每一个人的心灵内的生态，和教育在将我们带入的那个观念的生态，因此才是我们的重点。改造这两个生态，就必须像阿尔都塞在他的著名的《读资本论》前言中写的那样，我们的每一个人的看、读、听、写和说的姿势，也都须被彻底改造，从头开始学起，才有指望。而且还有更多：必须让我们每一个人摆脱盘踞在我们自己身上的那些旧有观念对我们的摆布，主动使我们自己涉入陌生领域。

贝特森认为，我们的心中的观念之间的生态，会影响生物生态或自然生态。因为，所有生物领域的多重决定，每一动物或植物的解剖特征和行动为细节，在基因和生理的层面上，都是由其参数的多重性来决定。正在运行的生态系统，也是这样地被多重地决定的（505）。哪怕是吃这一行为，

也是由胃口、习惯和社会规范来决定的，而不是由饥饿来决定的。呼吸，是由二氧化碳来管控的，是由二氧化碳的过多，而不是氧气的缺少来决定的。由人类规划师和工程师创造的产品，是用来满足特定的需要的，是更直接地来满足人的需要，因此其工作（与生物界的自我组织和自我管控相比）是较不靠谱的（505）。

贝特森知道，要在我们人人身上达到观念的灵活性，是不容易的。我们总是以短期眼光去抄了捷径，总是将观念编程得很僵硬，长期而言，这总会是灾难性的（ 505）。被重复使用的观念在我们心里留存下来后，实际上会被特殊对待，我们的心灵处理它们时，会与处理新观念很不同。习惯养成的过程中，我们总是

挑出了被重复使用的观念，将它们放进多少会是单立的范畴之中。这些被信赖的观念于是就总是被我们立刻投入使用，不经细致的思察，而本来，心灵的更灵活的那部分是可以被省下来，用到新的事务上去的。换句话说，一个给定的观念的经常被使用这一点，会决定在那个我们称作心灵的观念的生态中的是否留存（a determinant of its survival in that ecology of ideas which we callMind）（506）。

也就是说，在我们的这个叫做心灵的观念的生态中，被我们用得最熟练的那些观念，反而会被我们僵硬地编程，最后会妨碍我们接受和使用新观念。在贝特森看来，改变我们每一个人自己身上的生态，首先就是要阻挡这些我们自己最善于使用的观念对我们的阻挡。我们必须主动放弃这些观念对我们的主导，勇于打破自己的老习惯，将自己逼到新处境中，不使自己被窒息在自己的那些原有的观念的免疫系统之内。这与斯蒂格勒所说的技术生命必须像南瓜藤那样冒着死亡的危险往前爬，才能够真正幸存，是一样的道理。

而我们今天的问题正好是，在生态问题上，我们都像周末的沙发足球运动员了。在电视屏幕前，我们都很是了得，说和看得很多，懂的的确也很多，但是我们已无法作出例外的、开创性的行动，只受限于某种替代式经验之内了。哪怕说起生态这样的事来，我们也像在说治疗牙痛和关节炎那样了。

二、意识形态与观念之间生态：当代艺术、当代设计与意识形态

曼海姆在《意识形态与乌托邦》中指出，很多代人的乌托邦留到今天，就沉淀成为各种各种意识形态，像海贝留下的壳，供我们当代人习惯性地盘踞其间。我们进入其中的一种，来看其余的各种，就以为我们自己政治正确了，或就僵硬地走进了某种政治正确之中，为了图省事。今天，我们都知道，政治正确是捣浆糊。但是，如何走出政治正确呢？只有成为斗争者，不要成为好奇者和学习者，不拘泥于任何一种，才能走出自己所处的那种意识形态或政治正确幻觉。在斗争中学习，才是最安全的。这时我们才进入贝特森所说的观念的生态。

当代艺术实践，就是这样的一种斗争过程。当代艺术无法躲在任何一种意识形态里来发言，但它是我们的滑道，是我们的斗争“余地”。

最近三十年中国艺术家的意识形态躲猫猫是这样的：共产主义和社会主义是不好的，所以新自由主义意识形态才是好的。后八九的中国当代艺术是对这种新自由主义迷魂药的向往。仿佛后八九这种新自由主义主张不战而胜了一样。这种来自外国的意识形态许诺给我们市场式的平等和美国宪法修正案里许诺的那种言论自由。他们遵奉的是这样一种逻辑：Ａ是不好的，只剩下B了，所以Ｂ一定是好的。那么，如果Ｂ也不好呢，那么难道还有Ｃ？那就滑向C?如果C后来也发现不好，那是不是还有Ｄ备着呢？目前，在集权专制和川普式新法西斯民粹主义的挤压下，原来的那种新自由主义式的意识形态位置被挤到了一边。古根海姆的动保抗议就是这样一个例子：中国的当代艺术家们吃定的那种意识形态被挤掉了原来的位置。但哪里有一个新位置呢？下一步应该吃定什么意识形态呢？当代艺术如何与业已存在的各种意识形态打交道呢？

问题是，一个社会的意识形态光谱里，你从Ａ滑到Ｂ，也许是选择，再滑到Ｃ和Ｄ，就一定是闹剧了。在一个社会的意识形态的光谱里，你是无法躲猫猫！

曼海姆提出了这样一种意识形态理论：每个人都已处于某个意识形态之中了。ＴＡ都是在自己的某个意识形态中讨论别人所持的某种意识形态的。某种意识形态总是先已主导了ta。[1]摆脱某种意识形态，就意味着进入某种新的意识形态。而意识形态是对事实的故意模糊。比如机器人马上要战胜人类了！科学家还没下这个结论，读者自己却迫不及待地先往这样的洞洞里钻了！你是不敢站到一个没有任何意识形态打底的场地上的，那使我们恐惧。

马克思说，所有社会群体都被自己的阶级位置决定时。被自己的社会地位遮了眼，就看不到自己也处于这种光谱里的某种偏见之中。对此，曼海姆更进一步提出下面这种更一般性的概括：每一个人，连社会科学家的信念，也是他们自己所创造的上下文里的一个产品。[2]“观念是他们所处的时代的产物，是它们的主张者的社会地位的产物”。这样听上去是一种很相对主义的立场，但曼海姆也给出一种“关系论”的解决办法：在两种意识形态之间做出选择，是无谓和自我打败的。我们必须拆散这两种，重新配方它们里面的各种元素，做出新的组装。像做鸡尾酒那样。我们必须不断自制我们当前所处的意识形态。

这就是斗争的意思：只有斗争者自己才知道：上一刻里的立场，也无法被完整辩护的！这就是Bateson从控制论理解的我们的观念生态的僵硬：hard-programmed的观念系统：我们总是坚持那些已被我们坚持得很熟练和带来重复这快感的观念，克服这些观念对我们的缠绕和往死里拖，正是我们的生态工作。当代艺术正是在这方面说也是生态工作。

当代艺术经常以“生产出新知识，和生产出新的主体性自吹：其实它是生产出了三种：新知识、意识形态和幻觉。意识形态是艺术家个人携带的。比如说，艺术家常认为我们这个世界坏塌了，他仿佛要带给我们一个新的，但是，谁会要他带来的那个新的破世界呢，只要他好心就够了吗？他不知道自己选择的那一种也是某种意识形态，以为是什么新的救，要来强加给我们。实际上，他自己也不得不抱一种意识形态，跳不出来，但其实这也没关系的。

这是现代人的根本处境，韦伯和曼海姆持这种立场：现代社会的意识形态是一整个光谱，一个拼盘，[3]我们只能在其中认领某一缕来坚持，在这个由别人的各种光谱构成的图谱里开始我们的斗争。想要说服另一个人放弃其意识形态，来跟从我的，是要一个人从信印度教或佛教或儒教转到基督教中那样地困难的。

而当代艺术就是一种在这一光谱的各种立场之间滑动的一种社会实践，它比议会政治要轻松和游戏，但也仍然被那个社会的意识形态光谱所限定。　

 上面讨论的当代艺术与一个社会系统的意识形态谱系的关系，也可以用到当代设计和设计研究上。

三-从包豪斯屋到生态屋

包豪斯建筑理念中包含着生态思想吗? 从包豪斯屋走向生态屋，是可能的吗?还是说，整个包豪斯传统都是无法被纳入我们的生态学式思考之中，尤其不能被纳入上面的贝特森的以控制论为指导的观念生态学的方法论秩序之中的?本文作者持后一种观点。  

下面我们将通过评论2012年出版的《从包豪斯屋到生态屋》（Peder Anker,Louisiana State University,2010）一书，来讨论包豪斯传统与今天的生态困境之间的隔阂。

设计与生态科学之间的历史关系，可追溯到生态工程和生态建筑两个方向上，前者由太空计划发动，而后者曾是后期包豪斯的一个创设目标。格罗庇乌斯到了哈佛后，就在大卫.梭罗的瓦尔登湖边上建立生态屋。不过他的这些小项目都没有引起关注。

让我们通过讨论生态建筑与生态科学的关系，来比较包豪斯的设计哲学和生态屋的设计哲学之间的鸿沟。

迁到伦敦后，格氏的弟子和同事Moholy-Nagy 批判了Louis Sullivan那一著名的座右铭“形式跟着功能走（Form followsfunction）”。照Moholy-Nagy的理解，这句话的意思是：现象只发生于自然之中；在自然中，每一种形式都来自它自身的功能（《从包豪斯屋到生态屋》，3）。只有转向生物科学，形式才决定功能性，因而也才能决定人类的环境福利（4）。而改进社会健康和环境，设计师就必须通过生物学去理解真正的功能性，因为，真正的功能主义对于他们而言，也仍只是“根据自然法则来设计（designingaccording to the laws of nature）（4）。

正是在这一“根据自然法则来设计”的倡议下，建筑师赖特才建议他的拥戴者们只要领带自己的直就够了，不要让科学家们来置喙。包豪斯后期的以Moholy-Nagy为代表的激进包豪斯派其实已认识到了他们这场设计运动的人文、人道主义遗产的问题，认识到那是以人类为中心的，几乎是沙文主义式地对待自然的，不够顾及生态本身的。

那么，包豪斯的有机人道主义遗产如何在今天被继续坚持？包豪斯式的有机人道主义对于今天的生态主义者还重要吗?

似乎我们只能回答：不重要了。首先，自然，不是原来的包豪斯设计思想中所认识到的那个自然了。在拉图尔和James Lovelock最近的理解中，自然被看作与社会搅合，与政治合体。自然也是被组装的了。而包豪斯话语中的“自然”仍是田园式和装饰性的。如果包豪斯是保姆，它已找不到能照看的孩子了。

包豪斯的下一代学生和崇拜者如Richard BuckminsterFuller和Ian McHarg继续尝试联合艺术与科学。他们说的生态科学主要是指太空科学，是后者的生态工程设计吸引了他们。但那不是今天意义上的生态设计。

McHarg和新炼金术者小组（ the NewAlchemists）本来注重景观设计，这时也对太空舱的设计和驾驭有了兴趣。宇航员的被想象的生活，被他们当作设计模特。生物厕所、太阳能灶、再循环装置成为像Fuller, JohnTodd, 和Kenneth Yeang这样的生态建筑师的兴趣重点（128）。

太空殖民中，宇宙飞船太空舱的设计突出了生态学作为一种科学的重要性。Stewart Brand曾是太空殖民的主要推动者。他强调，这只是生态工作，“因为并没有涉及太空土著”（7）。一旦人类的社会、政治、道德和历史空间受到生态科学的侵犯，人类的环境就必须照太空舱式的太空殖民环境来被改造。要他看来，太空舱里的生态状况成了我们想象一种全新的生态环境的母基。我们巴不得想要让地球上的建筑与太空舱一样。

太空舱设计成了包豪斯设计运动的更激进的领域。而且舱里还可以通过宇航员的社会生活，而实验一种被技术地引导和管理的生活方式。不过，被生态地设计的未来生活，高度依赖太空舱式的生态式设计的空间，没有太多地考虑到更广泛的文化、美学和生社会价值。

联合艺术与科学，是包豪斯运动生态设计的核心。主张者认为，设计必须顺应自然法则，以便使功能有效地发挥出来。他们都是一般意义上说的科学建筑师。1930年代中期他们转到伦敦立脚后，他们开始主张，设计必须依据整个人的功能需要，这才能顺从自然。他们要求我们同时遵从人和自然，同时关心俩。他们主张，设计必须响应人的环境、理性、情感和社会需要，这同时也是在强调对物和图像作深入的历史研究。其生态设计更多的还是局限于环境设计，强调的是意象色彩的和谐、人和世界之间的切近（128）。

但是，包豪斯式的生态或环境设计只依赖于自身的观念，外部世界只被描述为工业环境。于是，大部分声称有包豪斯精神的设计师自己就像宇航员那样，坐进了太空舱，去发明可持续的房子，去接近理想中的自然家园，说是靠近了自然，其实只是想要挡开可能的生态苦难。这是很令人遗憾的。

最近的设计界中，我们看到Winy Maas和 Shigeru Ban正在将一种美学带到生态设计之中（Shigeru Ban,Shigeru Ban (Hannover, Germany: Expo 2000, 1999); Winy Maas, Metacity-Datatown(Rotterdam: MVRDV/010, 1999).）。 Randall Stout, Frank Gehry的前助手, 正在设计“生态炼金室（environmentalalchemy）（Randall Stout Architects,Environmental Alchemy (New York: Edizioni, 2004).），将现代主义建筑原则与生态原则结合起来。 Norman Foster在阿布扎比的 Masdar City  (2007)是另一个例子。130

Ocean Group 设计师网络目前正在模拟生物过程，用的是他们所说的生体模仿学（biomimetics）或构形-生态设计（ morpho-ecologicdesign）。

而格罗庇乌斯的宗旨是，重新联合艺术与科学，因为，没有这种联合，也就不会有真正的文化。但是，在今天，文化，绝对不是最终目标了。正如Gross指出，生态设计是必须是一种反思式社会性和比较人类学指导下的工作。[4]包豪斯的理想太一厢情愿了。

四、小结

   包豪斯设计理念断流了。生态设计是正在被设计中的生态。我们必须放弃包豪斯理想，另寻开端。

Color-changing inks respond to the environment  

London (CNN)She calls herself a "material alchemist" and when she describes her work, she invokes both science and magic.

Lauren Bowker

注释：

[1]It is the utopianelement-i.e. the nature of the dominant wish-which determines the sequence,order, and evaluation of single experiences. This wish is the organizingprinciple which even moulds the way in which we experience time. The form inwhich events are ordered and the unconsciously emphatic rhythm, which theindividual in his spontaneous observation of events imposes upon the flux oftime, appears in the utopia as an immediately perceptible picture, or at leasta directly intelligible set of meanings（《意识形态与   乌托邦》，Routledge, 1926, 188）。

[2]To begin with, itcould easily be shown that those who think in socialist and communist termsdiscern the ideological element only in the thinking of their opponents whileregarding their own thought as entirely free from any taint of ideology. Associologists there is no reason why we should not apply to Marxism theperceptions which it itself has produced, and point out from case to case itsideological character. Moreover, it should be explained that the concept Itideology " is being used here not as a negative value-judgment, in thesense of insinuating a conscious political lie, but is intended to designatethe outlook inevitably associated with a given historical and social situation,and the Weltanschauung and style of thought bound up with it. This meaning ofthe term, which bears more closely on the history of thought, must be sharplydifferentiated from the other meaning. Of course, we do not deny that in otherconnections it may also serve to reveal conscious political lies. Through thisprocedure nothing that has a positive value for scientific research in thenotion of ideology has been discarded. The great revelation it affords is thatevery form of historical and political thought is essentially conditioned bythe life situation of the thinker and his groups. I t is our task todisentangle this insight from its one-sided political encrustation, and toelaborate in a systematic manner the thesis that how one looks at history andhow one construes a total situation from given facts, depends on the positionone occupies within society. In every historical and political contribution itis possible to determine from what vantage point the objects were observed.However, the fact that our thinking is determined by our social position is notnecessarily a source of error. On the contrary, it is often the path topolitical insight. The 1 For what follows Part II should be referred to forfurther discussion of the problem, of which only the essentials will berepeated here. The concept of total, general, and non-evaluative ideology, asdescribed earlier, is the one used in the present context (cf. p. 71 H.). PartIV will deal with the evaluative conceptions of ideology and utopia. Henceforththe concept to be, used will be determined by the immediate purposes of theinvestigation.

112 IDEOLOGY ANDUTOPIA significant element in the conception of ideoJogy, in our opinion, isthe discovery that political thought is integrally bound up with social life.This is the essential meaning of the oft-quoted sentence, " It is not theconsciousness of men that determines their existence but, on the contrary,their social existence which determines their consciousness." 1 Butclosely related to this is another important feature of Marxist thought, namelya new conception of the relationship between theory and practice. Whereas thebourgeois theorist devoted a special chapter to setting forth his ends, andwhereas this always proceeded from a normative conception of society, one ofthe most significant steps Marx took was to attack the utopian element insocialism. From the beginning he refused to lay down an exhaustive set ofobjectives. There is no norm to be achieved that is detachable from the processitself : " Communism for us is not a condition that is to be establishednor an ideal to which reality must adjust itself. We call com':� munism the actual movement which abolishespresent conditions. The conditions under which this movement . proceeds resultfrom those now existing." 2 ",. If to-day. we ask a communist, with aLeninist training, what the future society will actually be like, he willanswer that the question is �n undialectical one, since the future itself will be decided in thepractical dialectical process of becoming. But what is this practicaldialectical process ? It signifies that we cannot calculate a priori what athing should be like and what it will be like. We can influence only thegeneral trend of the process of becoming. The ever-present concrete problem forus can only be the next step ahead. It is not the task of political thought toset up an absolute scheme of what should be. Theory, even including communisttheory, is a function of the process of becoming. The dialectical relationshipbetween theory and practice consists in the fact that, first of all, theoryarising out of a definitely social impUlse clarifies the situation. And in theprocess of clarification reality undergoes a change. We thereby enter a newsituation out of which a new theory emerges. The process is, then, as follows :(1) Theory is a function of reality ; (2) This theory leads to a certain kind 1Marx, Karl, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, tr. by N. I.Stone (Chicago, 1913), pp. 11-12. 2 Cf. Marx-Engels Archiv, ed. by D. Ryazanov(Frankfurt a.M.), vol. i, p. 252.

PROSPECTS OFSCIENTIFIC POLITICS 113 of action ; (3) Action changes the reality, or in caseof failure, forces us to a revision of the previous theory. The change in theactual situation brought about by the act gives rise to a new theory.1 Thisview of the relationship between theory and practice bears the imprint of anadvanced stage in the discussion of the problem. One notes that it was precededby the one-sidedness of an extreme intellectualism and a completurrationalisrn,and that it had to circumvent all the dangers which were already revealed inbourgeois and conservative thought and experience. The advantages of this solutionlie in the fact that it has assimilated the previous formulation of theproblem, and in its awareness of the fact that in the realm of politics theusual run of thought is unable to accomplish anything. On the other hand, thisoutlook is too thoroughly motivated by the desire for knowledge to fall into acomplete irrationalism like conservatism. The result of the conflict betweenthe two currents of thotlght is a very flexible conception of theory. A basiclesson derived from political experience which was most impressively formulatedby Napoleon in the maxim, It On s' engage, puis on voit," 2 here finds itsmethodological sanction.3 Indeed, political thought cannot be carried on byspeculating about it from the outside. Rather thought becomes illuminated whena concrete 1 .. When the proletariat by means of the class struggle changes itsposition in society and thereby the whole social structure, in takingcognizance of the changed social situation, i.e. of itself, it finds itselfface to face not merely with a new object of understanding, but also changesits position as a knowing subject. The theory serves to bring the proletariatto a consciousness of its social position, i.e. it enables it to envisageitself-simultaneously both as an object and a subject in the socialprocess." (Lu1ci.cs, Georg, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Berlin,1923.) .. This consciousness in turn becomes the motive force of new activity,since theory becomes a material force once it seizes the masses." (MarxEngels,Nachlass, i, p. 392.) 2 Indeed both Lenin and Lukacs, as representatives of thedialectical approach, . find justification in this Napoleonic maxim. a "Revolutionary theory is the generalization of the experiences of the labourmovement in all countries .. It naturally loses its very essence if it is notconnected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark ifits path is not illumined by revolutionary theory. But theory can become thegreatest force in the labour movement if it is indissolubly bound up withrevolutionary practice, for it alone can give to the movement confidence,guidance, strength, and understanding of the inner relations between events andit alone can help practice to clarify the process and direction of classmovements in the present and near future." (Joseph Stalin, Foundations ofLeninism, rev. ed. New York and London, 1932, pp. 26-7.) .

114 IDEOLOGY ANDUTOPIA situation is penetrated, not merely through acting and doing, but alsothrough the thinking whiCh must go with them. Socialist-communist theory isthen a synthesis of intuitionism and a determined desire to comprehendphenomena in an extremely rational way. Intuitionism is present in this theorybecause it denies the possibility of exact calculations of events in advance oftheir happening. The rationalist tendency enters because it aims to fit into arational scheme whatever novelty comes to view at any moment. At no time is itpermissible to act without theory, but the theory that arises in the course ofaction will be on a different level from the theory that went before.1 It isespecially revolutions that create a more valuable type of knowledge. Thisconstitutes the synthesis which men are likely to make when they live in themidst of irrationality and recognize it a�.-'such, but do not despair of the attemptto interpret it rationally. Marxist thought is akin to conservative thought inthat it does not deny the existence of an irrational sphere and does not try toconceal it as the bureacratic mentality does, or treat it in a purelyintellectual fashion as if it were rational, as liberal-democratic thinkers do.It is distinguished from ·· conservative thought, however, in that it conceivesof this relative irrationality as potenti'IJIy comprehensible through newmethods of rationalization.2 For even in this type of thought, 1 Revolution,particularly, creates the situation propitious to significant knowledge :" History in general, the history of revolutions in particular, has alwaysbeen richer, more varied, and variform, more vital and , cunning ' than isconceived of by the best parties, by the most conscious vanguards of the mostadvanced classes. This is natural, for the best vanguards express theconsciousness, will, passions, and fancies of but tens of thousands, whereasthe revolution is effected at the moment of the exceptional exaltation andexertion of all the human facultiesconsciousness, will, passion, phantasy, oftens of millions, spurred on by the bitterest class war." (N. Lenin," Left " Communism : an Infantile Disorder, published by the Toiler,n.d. pp. 76-7, also New York and London, 1934.) It is interesting to observethat from this point of view revolution appears not as an intensification ofthe passions resident in men nor as mere irrationaUty. This passion is valuableonly because it makes possible the fusion of the accumulated rationality testedout experimentally in the individual experiences of millions. 2 Thus, fate,chance, everything sudden and unexpected, and the reli gious view which arisestherefrom, are conceived of as functions of the degree in which ourunderstanding of history has not yet reached the stage of rationality. "Fear of the blind forces of capitalism, blind because they cannot be foreseenby the masses of the people, forces which at every step in the lives of theproletariat and the small traders threaten to bring and do bring ' sudden ', ,unexpected ', ' accidental ' disaster and ruin, converting

PROSPECTS OFSCIENTIFIC POLITICS 115 the sphere of the irrational is not entirelyirrational, arbitrary, or incomprehensible. It is true that there are nostatically fixed and definite laws to which this creative process conforms, norare there any exactly recurring sequences of events, but at the same time onlya limited number of situations can occur even here. And this after all is thedecisive consideration. Even when new elements in historical development emergethey do not constitute merely a chain of unexpected events ; the politicalsphere itself is permeated by tendencies which, even though they are subject tochange, through their very presence do nevertheless determine to a large extentthe various possibilities（114-115）.

[3]这个光谱或拼盘由这样几种立场构成：1）官僚保守主义；2）保守的历史主义； 3）自由-民主的资产阶级思想； 4）社会主义-共产主义构想；5）法西斯主义。This may be easily seen by a survey ofthe various political and social currents of the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies. As the most important representative ideal-types, we cite thefollowing :1. Bureaucratic conservatism. 2. Conservative historicism. 3.Liberal-democratic bourgeois thought. 4. The socialist-communist conception. 5.Fascism.

PROSPECTS OFSCIENTIFIC POLITICS 105 The mode of thought of bureaucratic conservatism willbe considered first. The fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought is toturn all problems of politics into problems of administration. As a result, themajority of books on politics in the history of German political science are defacto treatises on administration. If we consider the role that bureaucracy hasalways played, especially in the Prussian state, and to what extent theintelligentsia was largely an intelligentsia drawn from the bureaucracy, thisonesidedness of the history of political science in Germany becomes easilyintelligible（ 104-105）.

To-day we recognizethat behind every theory there are collective forces expressive ofgroup-purposes, -power, and -interests. Parliamentary discussions are thus farfrom being theoretical in the sense that they may ultimately arrive at theobjective truth : they are concerned with very real issues to be decided in theclash of interests. It was left for the socialist movement which arosesubsequently as the opponent of the bourgeoisie to elaborate specifically thisaspect of the debate about real issues. 110

[4] At fi rst glance, in an experimental knowledge society that isfocusing on experiments in society, the anthropologist, political scientist,geographer, or sociologist is sentenced to passive observation. However, one ofthe means of refl exivity in modern society has been the social sciences,perhaps most explicitly in the discipline of sociology. Sociology is generallyrendered as a refl exive discipline that aims to develop an awareness of thesocial world (cf. Bourdieu 1990; Coleman 1990; Luhmann 1992). As a refl exivediscipline, its subject matter also encompasses itself. In this vein, I wouldlike to raise three points here. First, the historical discussion in chapter 2demonstrates that from the very beginning of American social science,sociologists have imputed to society the language of experimenting. There canbe no experimental practice without its refl exive description as experiment interms of design, data collection, and interpretation of effects. Second, from amethodological point of view, the most consequential distinction betweenexperiments in the laboratory and experiments in the real world is controlversus lack of control with respect to boundary conditions and parametervariation. Researchers of the social world are not free to defi ne at will themost feasible boundaries and parameter values. Instead, they have to take ondecisions made by the responsible political bodies. Still, these are deliberatedecisions that are activated by legislative or other institutional measures.Therefore, they can be taken as conditions of intervention to which differenteffects can causally be related. Even the best-controlled group experiments(for example, in correction institutions) carry features of an experimentalsociety as manipulation of subjects or  “victims ”  has (or should have) legal,ethical, and communicative limits. This leads to my third point — theinvolvement of participants. The standard method of experiment strictlydetaches the experimenter from the experimental setting or system. Socialscientists in a knowledge society of selfexperimentation cannot possibly pursuethis method. To a certain degree, all social groups from planners, ecologists,to concerned citizens are participant observers. Especially with the case ofMontrose Point, there exists a broad variety of methodological models fornegotiating and organizing participatory strategies.

In short, processes of science in public andthe heterogeneous actors involved can lead to more effective refl exivity, andin this sense it means a relaxation toward more bottom-up approaches inknowledge production outside the laboratory. However, given the necessarypreparedness for surprises, this relaxation needs to be planned and assessedeven more carefully than traditional top-down approaches and strict substantiveregulations. Planning the unplannable to learn from surprising events is muchharder than trying to avoid surprises.

The framework presented above embraces ananticipatory approach to robust research implementations and learning. Althoughthe surprises that are associated with ecological implementations cannot beeliminated, their negative effects may be made less painful and far shorterlived through experimental recursive practice incorporating the various modesof science, knowledge production, and implementations in public. The paradoxresult is that the more robust a strategy becomes, the more importantsurprising events (including negative ones — that is, failures and crisis)become as prerequisite for nonknowledge as a working base for the production ofnew and corroborated knowledge — that is, the foundation for social robustness.

As is discussed in the previous chapters, agood deal of modern science tends to extend research processes beyond the wallsof the laboratory into wider society. The traditional model that used todescribe the relationship

between science and the public wasone where the practical use of scientifi c knowledge was perceived in a linearand deductive fashion: research results are to be used by the public orpolicymakers to make decisions. These basic premises of scientifi c managementhave been questioned. The technical application of value-free, objective, anddefi nite research results have long since been unmasked as at best an exceptionand more likely as a social fi ction. Scientifi c research has moved out of thelaboratory, taking with it in its train the uncertainty of knowledge productionbut also the opportunity to learn from surprises. This can be seen as a processof negotiation between science and the public.

In the way that ecological restorationappeared on the agenda as a mode 2 form of research in the late 1970s, later anoffi cial form of scientifi c knowledge production (mode 1) was graduallyestablished before it began to be partially superseded by another phase ofascending mode 2 knowledge production. Thus, it can be concluded that in fi eldssuch as ecological design (and probably many more areas), there is a demandinginterdependence between a mode 1 and the mode 2 production of knowledge. Theanalytical demarcation of forms of knowledge production does not split them offfrom one another but rather makes visible an increase of border traffi c betweenthem, which produces exactly the novel forms of cooperation and thus theimportant challenges that include new and surprising events that are locatedoutside the sphere of quantifi able prediction and risk assessments. This means majorchallenges for democratic societies and their understanding of the role ofscience（Mathias Bross, 《无知与惊奇--科学、社会和生态设计》， MIT， 2010，178）。.

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